

S-E-C-R-E-T

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19 September 1973

NOTE FOR : THE RECORD

SUBJECT : On Expanding INR's Strength

Reference: INR documents, this subject

1. The comments below deal only with INR's stated Functions Nos. 2 and 3 (research and analysis in depth, and participating in production of NIEs).

2. These functions are wholly legitimate for INR: CIA and the USG, as well as State, gain from having an independent INR research and analysis capability which can both support State's own policy needs, and give the NSC State's views on this and that subject. The comments which follow do not fight this problem at all, but do raise certain questions about whether greatly expanding INR's numbers is the best answer to INR's unhappiness.

3. There are some unknowns which hamper fully effective comment.

a. Are the new positions INR is requesting to come from elsewhere in State? Or, would the increase of INR size mean an increase in State's total positions? DDI/CIA attitudes should be the more critical in the latter event.

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b. Has some policy decision already been made to give State a larger voice within the intelligence community than it now has? If so, then there is more legitimacy to State's present proposals. But if not, then INR's size would be expanding by about one quarter, at a time when all of the rest of the intelligence community will be cutting back. Even if State were permitted to retain its present INR strength, with no additions, but at a time when CIA and the rest of the intelligence community are cutting back, then State to some degree would achieve its stated purpose of greater comparative impact within the intelligence community.

4. As a CIA officer who has long worked with State, and who has profited from INR's insights and cooperativeness, it has hurt to see what has been a clear decline in INR's contributions of late -- especially so under such excellent leadership as Ray Cline's. I do not feel, however, that that question of impact can be faced as well by increasing INR's size as by making some significant changes within State:

a. Most importantly, such changes made at top levels as will (1) improve the quality of State officers assigned to INR; and (2) provide for close and careful top-level State regard for INR's views.


b. Also, such changes at the INR level as will (1) improve the impact of INR written work, through better formats and sharper presentation; and (2) make much more efficient use of INR's existing numbers, through cutting back on some of INR's overly ponderous procedures and bulky paperwork.

5. With respect to INR's Function No. 3 (estimative), the increasingly technical nature of MBFR, SALT, CSCE, and other subjects is going to require that every analytic office be staffed with quality officers, a consideration which underlines this memo's judgment that numbers alone (warm bodies) are not the answer to INR's needs -- or any production office's needs. Moreover, a good case can be made for holding off on confident requests for more people to work on INR support of estimates until the procedures and requirements of NIE's-by-NIO's have been worked out in experience.

6. As for research in depth, and trying not to be parochial about it, I do feel that CIA/DDI has so many advantages over INR, re quality research in depth, that this particular field is not one that State should try to plow too much. INR should instead put its analytic chips on short, succinct, to-the-point analyses, think pieces, and so-what papers in direct support of senior State officers and NSC staff.

7. Again, unless DCI specifically wants to see INR beefed up, or unless there is great State fat elsewhere from which INR can borrow, the taxpayer, State, and the intelligence community would I think benefit from keeping INR at its present size, urging qualitative improvements on certain of State's procedures re INR, and relying upon better INR and CIA research, within existing or reduced overall position ceilings.

8. If the NIS program finally goes, would it be feasible for CIA to transfer some of its NIS positions (and people) back to State/INR?



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